In this paper we show that a large class of diverse problems have a bicomposite structure which makes it possible to solve them with a new type of algorithm called dissection, which has better time/memory tradeoffs than previously known algorithms. A typical example is the problem of finding the key of multiple encryption schemes with r independent n-bit keys. All the previous error-free attacks required time T and memory M satisfying T M = 2 rn , and even if "false negatives" are allowed, no previous attack could achieve T M < 2 3rn/4 . Our new technique yields the first algorithm which never errs and finds all the possible keys with a smaller product of T M , such as T = 2 4n time and M = 2 n memory for breaking the sequential execution of r = 7 block ciphers. The improvement ratio we obtain increases in an unbounded way as r increases, and if we allow algorithms which can sometimes miss solutions, we can get even better tradeoffs by combining our dissection technique with parallel collision search. To demonstrate the generality of the new algorithmic technique, we show how to use it in a generic way in order to solve with better time complexities (for small memory complexities) hard combinatorial search problems, such as solving knapsack problems, or finding the shortest sequence of face rotations which can unscramble a given state of Rubik's cube.
INTRODUCTION

Bicomposite problems
The goal of this paper is to describe a new algorithmic approach, which we call dissection, for solving certain types of hard combinatorial search problems which have what we call a bicomposite structure. In order to understand this new concept, let us consider first the standard way in which many combinatorial search problems are described, which is based on the notion of an execution matrix. In this representation, the process of solving the problem is described by a sequence of intermediate states (described by the successive rows in Fig. 1 ), in which the first row describes the given initial state, and the last row describes the desired final state. The allowed transitions between successive states are described by a list of possible actions A, and at any point in time one of these actions is chosen, which maps the current state into some next state. The algorithmic problem is to find a sequence of b actions which maps the initial state into the final state. One can always solve such problems by trying out all the |A| b possible sequences of actions, but in many concrete cases it is possible to exploit special properties of the states and actions in order to lower this exponential complexity.
. . . Problems which can be described with such a sequence of states and actions in the form of an execution matrix are called composite problems, since their solution process can be decomposed into simpler subproblems which can be solved independently of each other (e.g., by considering several subsequences of actions, which interact with each other only through their joint effect on the global state). A particularly effective way of exploiting this independence is to consider the top and bottom halves of the execution matrix separately and using a meet-in-the-middle (MITM) approach to make sure that the middle state is the same as we approach it from both sides (in many cases, each one of these two parts can be further partitioned into smaller parts, which are solved recursively with a similar MITM approach). Note that in order to go backwards from the last state towards the middle, we have to assume that the individual actions are invertible, and thus we can apply them both forwards in order to map the current state into the next state, and backwards in order to map the current state into the previous state. To simplify the description of our new algorithms and the analysis of their complexity, we will concentrate in this paper on cases in which all the basic operations have such an invertible behavior. However, as demonstrated in Section 3.7 we can also handle the general case of non-invertible operations by using more complicated algorithms with slightly higher complexities. In particular, this makes it possible to find improved attacks on message authentication codes (MACs) which are defined by the sequential execution of several keyed hash functions, which can only be executed in the forward direction. Note that standard MITM attacks cannot be applied in this case, since we have to encrypt the inputs and decrypt the outputs in order to compare the results in the middle of the computation.
Cryptanalysis of Multiple-Encryption Cryptosystems
Our original motivation in developing the new dissection algorithm was to find more efficient algorithms for finding the secret keys of certain types of block ciphers called multiple-encryption. A block cipher is a cryptographic scheme which maps for each fixed key an n-bit plaintext into an n-bit ciphertext in an invertible way. An ideal block cipher can be viewed as a family of 2 k randomly chosen permutations over n-bit strings where k is the bit length of the key (to simplify our notations, we will assume in this paper that k = n, unless stated otherwise). More formal definitions of block ciphers and their security can be found in [Goldreich 2001] . Note that block ciphers are always susceptible to exhaustive search attacks by adversaries that try all the 2 n possible keys. To increase the security of such constructions (in order to put the complexity of exhuasitve search well beyond the ability of any adversary), it was suggested to concatenate block ciphers, each using an indepedently chosen key. Such a construction is called a multiple-encryption scheme. As described in Fig 2, such schemes encrypt a plaintext block of n bits into a ciphertext block of n bits by applying to it a sequence of r block ciphers which use independent n-bit keys.
A simple information-theoretic argument shows that in order to make the full rnbit key of this scheme unique with a reasonable probability, the cryptanalyst needs r known plaintext/ciphertext pairs,since each given pair of blocks reduces the number of possible keys by a factor of about 2 −n . The full encryption process can thus be described by an r×r execution matrix whose columns corresponds to the processing of the various plaintexts and whose rows correspond to the application of the various block ciphers. The attacker is given the r plaintexts at the top and the r ciphertexts at the bottom, and his goal is to find all the keys with a generic algorithm which does not assume the existence of any weaknesses in the underlying block ciphers.
Fig. 2. Multiple Encryption Scheme with r Independent Keys
What makes such an execution matrix special is that it can be partitioned into independent parts not only along the time dimension (i.e., into groups of consecutive rows) but also along the state dimension (i.e., into groups of consecutive columns), since the keys are independently chosen and the plaintexts are independently processed. In particular, if we know certain subsets of keys and certain subsets of intermediate values, we can process all the known intermediate values with the known keys without having to worry about the lack of knowledge of other plaintexts and keys. Our ability to concentrate in bicomposite problems on any particular rectangle within the execution matrix is demonstrated in Fig. 3 . As we will show later in this paper, there are many other examples of bicomposite search problems, and all of them can be solved with a common type of approach called dissection which makes use of the existence of such double partitioning possibilities.
The security of multiple-encryption schemes had been analyzed for more than 30 years, but most of the published papers had dealt with either double or triple encryption (triple-DES is still widely used). While the security provided by double and triple encryption is well understood and we can not push their analysis any further, our new techniques show that surprisingly efficient attacks can be applied already when we make the next step and consider quadruple encryption, and that additional improvements can be made when we consider even longer combinations. This can be viewed as a dual result to the surprising discovery by Joux [Joux 2004] in 2004 that finding collisions in hash functions defined by the parallel execution of several independent hash functions is much easier than previously believed. What we show in this paper is that finding the key of a multiple-encryption scheme defined by the sequential execution of several independent cryptosystems is also much easier than previously believed, given a restricted amount of memory.
Since we can usually reduce the time complexity of cryptanalytic attacks by increasing their memory complexity, we will be interested in the full tradeoff curve between these two complexities rather than in a single point on it. We will be primarily interested in algorithms which use an exponential combination of M = 2 mn memory and T = 2 tn time for a small constant m and a larger constant t, when the key size n grows to infinity. While this setup may sound superficially similar to Hellman's time/memory tradeoff algorithms [Hellman 1980] , it is important to notice that Hellman's preprocessing phase requires time which is equivalent to exhaustive search and memory which is at least the square root of the number of keys, and that in Hellman's online phase the product of time and memory is larger than the number of keys. In our model we do not allow free preprocessing, we can use smaller amounts of memory, and the product of time and memory is strictly smaller than the number of keys.
Standard meet-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks, which account for the best known results against double and triple encryption, try to split such an execution matrix into a top part and a bottom part with a single horizontal partition line which crosses the whole matrix from left to right. Our new techniques use a more complicated way to split the execution matrix into independent parts by simultaneously partitioning it along the horizontal and vertical dimensions. For example, let us consider the sequential execution of 7 independent block ciphers. We can find the full 7n-bit key in just 2 4n time and 2 n memory by guessing two of the seven internal states after the application of the third block cipher and one of the seven internal states after the application of the fifth block cipher. We call such an irregular way to partition the execution matrix with partial guesses a dissection, since it mimics the way a surgeon operates on a patient by using multiple cuts of various lengths at various locations.
The Knapsack Problem -Solving Hard Instances Using Dissection
To demonstrate the generality of our new techniques, we also show how to apply them to several types of combinatorial search problems (which have nothing to do with cryp-tography), such as the knapsack problem:
1 Given n generators a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a n which are n-bit numbers, we wish to find a subset that sums modulo 2 n to a given target value S. The best known special purpose algorithm for this problem was published at Eurocrypt 2011 by Becker et al. [Becker et al. 2011 ], but our generic dissection technique provides better time complexities for small memory complexities. To show how to describe knapsacks as (almost) bicomposite search problems, consider the solution of the given knapsack problem as a two dimensional r × r execution matrix, in which we partition the generators into r groups of n/r generators, and partition each number into r blocks of n/r consecutive bits. Each row in the matrix is defined by adding the appropriate subset of generators from the next group to the accumulated sum computed in the previous row. We start with an initial value of zero, and our problem is to find some execution that leads to the desired value S after the last row. This representation is essentially bicomposite since the choices made in the various rows of this matrix are completely independent, and the computations made in the various columns of this matrix are almost independent since the only way they interact with each other is via the addition carries which do not tend to propagate very far into the next block. This makes it possible to guess and operate on partial states, and thus we can apply almost the same dissection technique we use for multiple-encryption schemes. Note that unlike the case of multiple-encryption in which the value of r was specified as part of the given problem, here we can choose any desired value of r independently of the given value of n in order to optimize the time complexity for any available amount of memory. In particular, by choosing r = 7 we can reduce the best known time complexity for hard knapsacks when we use M = 2 n/7 = 2 0.1428n memory from 2 (3/4−1/7)n = 2 0.6071n
in [Becker et al. 2011 ] to 2 4n/7 = 2 0.5714n with our new algorithm. The algorithm of Becker et al. [Becker et al. 2011 ] crucially depends on the fact that addition is an associative and commutative operation on numbers, and that sets can be partitioned into the union of two subsets in an exponential number of ways. Our algorithms make no such assumptions, and thus they can be applied under a much broader set of circumstances. For example, consider a non-commutative variant of the knapsack problem in which the generators a i are permutations over {1, 2, . . . , k}, and we have to find a product of length of these generators which is equal to some given permutation S (a special case of this variant is the problem of finding the fastest way to solve a given state of Rubik's cube by a sequence of face rotations, which was analyzed extensively in the literature). To show that this problem is bicomposite, we have to represent it by an execution matrix with independent rows and columns. Consider an × k matrix in which the i-th row represents the action of the i-th permutation in the product, and the j-th column represents the current location of element j from the set. Our goal is to start from the identity permutation at the top, and end with the desired permutation S at the bottom. We can reduce this matrix to size r × r for any desired r by bunching together several permutations in the product and several elements from the set. The independence of the rows in this matrix follows from the fact that we can freely choose the next generators to apply to the current state, and the independence of the columns follows from the fact that we can know the new location of each element j if we know its previous location and which permutation was applied to the state, even when we know nothing about the locations of the other elements in the previous state. This makes it possible to guess partial states at intermediate stages, and thus to apply the same dissection algorithms as in the knapsack problem with the same improved complexities.
We note that some ideas which are reminiscent of the basic dissection technique were used before, in the context of several specific bicomposite problems. These include the algorithms of Schroeppel and Shamir [Schroeppel and Shamir 1981] and of Becker et al. [Becker et al. 2011 ] which analyzed the knapsack problem, the algorithm of van Oorschot and Wiener [van Oorschot and Wiener 1996] which attacked double and triple encryption, and [Dinur et al. 2012a] in the specific case of the block cipher GOST. A common feature of all these algorithms is that none of them could beat the tradeoff curve T M = N 3/4 , where N is the total number of keys. The algorithms of [Dinur et al. 2012a] and of [Schroeppel and Shamir 1981; van Oorschot and Wiener 1996] matched this curve only for a single point, and the recent algorithm of Becker et al. [Becker et al. 2011] managed to match it for a significant portion of the tradeoff curve. Our new dissection algorithms not only allow to beat this curve, but actually allow to obtain the relation T M < N 3/4 for any amount of memory in the range M ≤ N 1/4 .
Organization of the Paper
This paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we briefly introduce some of our notation. In Section 3, we introduce the general dissection technique and present our best error-free attacks on multiple encryption. In Section 4, we consider the model when "false negatives" are allowed, and show that the dissection algorithms can be combined with the parallel collision algorithm of van Oorschot and Wiener [van Oorschot and Wiener 1996] to get an improved time-memory tradeoff curve. In Section 5, we apply our techniques to several other combinatorial search problems, such as solving Rubik's cube with the smallest possible number of face rotations and solving the hardest instances of knapsack problems. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper and describes some open problems.
NOTATIONS AND CONVENTIONS
In this paper we denote the basic block cipher by E and assume that it uses nbit blocks and n-bit keys (we can easily deal with other sizes, but it makes the notation and the discussion cumbersome). We denote by E i the encryption process with key k i , and denote by E [1...r] the multiple-encryption scheme which uses r independent keys to encrypt the plaintext P and produce the ciphertext , we are usually given r plaintext/ciphertext pairs, which are expected to make the key unique (at intermediate stages, we may be given fewer than i−j +1 plaintext/ciphertext pairs for E [i...j] , and then we are expected to produce all the compatible keys). In all our exponential complexity estimates, we consider expected rather than maximal possible values (under standard randomness assumptions, they differ by no more than a logarithmic factors), and ignore multiplicative polynomial factors in n and r.
DISSECTING THE MULTIPLE-ENCRYPTION PROBLEM
In this section we develop our basic dissection algorithms that allow to solve efficiently the problem of multiple encryption. Given r-encryption with r independent keys, r nbit plaintext/ciphertext pairs and 2 mn memory cells, the algorithms find all possible values of the keys which comply with the plaintext/ciphertext pairs, or prove that there are no such keys. The algorithms are deterministic, in the sense that they do not use random bits and they always succeed since they implicitly scan all possible solutions.
This section is organized as follows. In Section 3.1 we briefly describe the classical meet-in-the-middle attack which serves as a basis to our algorithms. In Section 3.2 we present the most basic dissection algorithm, and apply it to 4-encryption. In Section 3.3, we discuss natural extensions of the basic dissection algorithm, which dissect the cipher in a symmetric way by splitting it into parts of equal size. In Section 3.4 we present asymmetric dissection algorithms (which split the cipher into parts of different sizes), and use them to obtain a sequence of asymmetric dissection algorithms which are more efficient than the symmetric ones. In Section 3.5, we present a formal framework for dissection algorithms, and show the optimality of our algorithms in this framework. In While our basic algorithms and analysis apply only to the case where M = 2 n , in Section 3.6 we show that a small modification of these algorithms allow us to extend the dissection algorithms to any fixed amount of memory. We use these algorithms to list the complexities of our most efficient deterministic dissection algorithms for all r ≤ 40 and m ≤ 10 in Table I . Finally, in Section 3.7 we describe dissection algorithms in the case where instead of encryptions we are given a sequence of keyed One-way functions.
A reader which is interested mainly in the ideas of the dissection algorithms and not in the details and generalizations, may concentrate on Sections 3.2 and 3.4 and leave the other sections for later reading.
Previous Work -The Meet-in-the-Middle Attack
The trivial algorithm for recovering the key an r-encryption scheme is exhaustive search over the 2 rn possible key values, whose time complexity is 2 rn , and whose memory requirement is negligible. In general, with no additional assumptions on the algorithm and on the subkeys, this is the best possible algorithm.
In [Merkle and Hellman 1981] Merkle and Hellman observed that if the keys used in the encryption are independent, an adversary can trade time and memory complexities, using a MITM approach. In this attack, the adversary chooses a value u, 1 ≤ u ≤ r/2 , and for each possible combination of the first u keys
. . , P r ) and stores it in a sorted table (along with the respective key candidate). Then, for each value of the last r − u keys, the adversary computes the vector D [u+1...r] (C 1 , C 2 , . . . , C r ) and checks whether the value appears in the table (each such collision suggests a key candidate (k 1 , . . . , k r )). The right key is necessarily suggested by this approach, and in cases when other keys are suggested, additional plaintext/ciphertext pairs can be used to sieve the wrong key candidates.
The time complexity of this algorithm is T = 2 (r−u)n , whereas its memory complexity is M = 2 un . Hence, the algorithm allows to achieve the tradeoff curve T M = 2 rn for any values T, M such that M ≤ 2 r/2 n . 2 Note that the algorithm can be applied also if the number of available plaintext/ciphertext pairs is r < r. In such a case, it outputs all the possible key candidates, whose expected number is 2 (r−r )n (since the plaintext/ciphertext pairs yield an r n-bit condition on the 2 rn possible keys). The MITM attack, designed for breaking double-encryption, is still the best known generic attack on double encryption schemes. It is also the best known attack up to logarithmic factors 3 for triple encryption, which was studied very extensively due to its relevance to the former de-facto encryption standard Triple-DES. 2 We note that the algorithm, as described above, works only for u ∈ N. However, it can be easily adapted to non-integer values of u ≤ r/2 , preserving the tradeoff curve T M = 2 rn . 3 We note that a logarithmic time complexity improvement can be achieved in these settings as suggested by Lucks [Lucks 1998 ]. The improvement relies on the variance in the number of keys encrypting a given plaintext to a given ciphertext. This logarithmic gain in time complexity comes at the expense of an exponential increase in the data complexity (a factor 8 gain in the time complexity when attacking triple-DES increases the data from 3 plaintext-ciphertext pairs to 2 45 such pairs).
The Basic Dissection Algorithm: Attacking 4-Encryption
In the following, we show that for r ≥ 4, the basic MITM algorithm can be outperformed significantly, using a dissection technique. For the basic case r = 4, considered in this section, our algorithm runs in time T = 2 2n with memory 2 n , thus allowing to reach T M = 2 3n , which is significantly better than the T M = 2 4n curve suggested by the meet-in-the-middle attack.
The main idea behind the algorithm is to dissect the 4-encryption into two 2-encryption schemes, and to apply the MITM attack to each of them separately. The partition is achieved by enumerating parts of the internal state at the dissection point. The basic algorithm, which we call Dissect 2 (4, 1), is as follows:
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(1) Given plaintexts (P 1 , P 2 , P 3 , P 4 ) and their corresponding ciphertexts (C 1 , C 2 , C 3 , C 4 ), for each candidate value of X 2 1 = E k2 (E k1 (P 1 )): (2) (a) Run the standard MITM attack on 2-round encryption with (P 1 , X 2 1 ) as a single plaintext-ciphertext pair. For each of the 2 n values of (k 1 , k 2 ) outputted by the attack, partially encrypt P 2 using (k 1 , k 2 ), and store in a sorted table the corresponding values of X n values of (k 3 , k 4 ), partially decrypt C 2 using (k 3 , k 4 ) and check whether the suggested value for X 2 2 appears in the table. If so, retrieve (k 1 , k 2 ) from the table, and check whether (k 1 , k 2 , k 3 , k 4 ) encrypts P 3 and P 4 into C 3 and C 4 , respectively.
We illustrate the Dissect 2 (4, 1) algorithm in Figure 4 .
It is easy to see that once the right value for X 2 1 is considered, the right values of (k 1 , k 2 ) are found in Step 2(a) and the right values of (k 3 , k 4 ) are found in Step 2(b), and thus, the right value of the key is necessarily found. The time complexity of the algorithm is 2 2n . Indeed, Steps 2(a) and 2(b) are called 2 n times (for each value of X 2 1 ), and each of them runs the basic MITM attack on 2-encryption in expected time and memory of 2 n . Following the randomness of a block cipher (for a random block cipher, about 2 −n of the keys satisfy that the encryption of a given plaintext P is a given ciphertext C), the number of expected collisions in the table of X 2 2 is 2 n . Thus, the expected time complexity of the attack 5 is 2 n · 2 n = 2 2n . The memory consumption of the 2-encryption MITM steps is expected to be about 2 n . The size of the table computed in Steps 2(a) is also 2 n , since each MITM step is expected to output 2 n key candidates. Hence, the expected memory complexity of the entire algorithm is 2 n .
Natural Extensions of the Basic Dissection Algorithm
We now consider the case (r > 4, m = 1) and show that natural extensions of the Dissect 2 (4, 1) algorithm presented above, allow us to significantly increase the gain over the standard MITM attack for larger values of r. It is clear that any algorithm for r -encryption can be extended to attack r-encryption for any r > r , by trying all possible r −r keys (k r +1 , . . . , k r ), and applying the basic algorithm to the remaining E [1...r ] . The time complexity is increased by a multiplicative factor of 2 (r−r )n , and hence, the ratio 2 rn /T M is preserved. This leads to the following natural definition.
Definition 3.1. The gain of an algorithm A for r-encryption whose time and memory complexities are T and M , respectively, is defined as
The maximal gain amongst all deterministic algorithms for r-encryption which use 2 mn memory, is denoted by Gain D (r, m) (where "D" stands for "deterministic").
By the trivial argument above, Gain D (r, 1) is monotone non-decreasing with r. The Dissect 2 (4, 1) algorithm shows that Gain D (r, 1) ≥ 1 for r = 4, and hence, for all r ≥ 4. Below we suggest two natural extensions, which allow to increase the gain up to √ r.
3.3.1. The LogLayer Algorithm:. The first extension of the Dissect 2 (4, 1) is the recursive LogLayer r algorithm, applicable when r is a power of 2, which tries all the possible X 2i 1 for i = 1, 2, . . . , r/2 − 1 and runs a simple MITM attacks on each subcipher E [2i+1,2i+2] separately. As each such attack returns 2 n candidate keys (which can be stored in memory of (r/2) · 2 n ), the algorithm then groups 4 encryptions together, enumerates the values X 4i 2 for i = 1, 2, . . . , r/4 − 1, and runs MITM attacks on each subcipher E [4i+1...4i+4] separately (taking into account that there are only 2 n possibilities for the keys (k 4i+1 , k 4i+2 ) and 2 n possibilities for the keys (k 4i+3 , k 4i+4 )). The algorithm continues recursively (with log r layers in total), until a single key candidate is found. We illustrate LogLayer for 8-encryption in Figure 5 .
The memory complexity of LogLayer r is 2 n (as we need to store no more than r tables, each of size 2 n ). As in the j-th layer of the attack, (r/2 j ) − 1 intermediate values are enumerated, and as each basic MITM attack has time complexity of 2 n , the overall time complexity of the attack is log r j=1 2 n((r/2 j )−1) · 2 n = 2 n(r−log r) .
Therefore, the gain is Gain(LogLayer r ) = log r − 1, which shows that Gain D (r, 1) ≥ log r − 1. . Given these values, the adversary can attack each of the rencryptions (e.g., E [1...r ] ), separately, and obtain 2 n "solutions" on average, which are stored in sorted tables. Then, the adversary can treat each r -round encryption as a single encryption with 2 n possible keys, and apply an r -encryption attack to recover the key.
The time complexity of Square r is equivalent to repeating 2 (r −1)(r −1)n times a sequence of r + 1 attacks on r -encryption. Hence, the time complexity is at most 2 [(r −1)(r −1)+(r −1)]·n , and the memory complexity remains 2 n . Therefore,
Obviously, improving the time complexity of attacking r -encryption with 2 n memory reduces the time complexity of Square r as well. However, as the best attacks of this kind known to us yield a gain of O( √ r ) = O(r 1/4 ), the improvement to the overall gain of Square r is negligible.
Asymmetric Dissections: 7-Encryption and Beyond
A common feature shared by the LogLayer r and the Square r algorithms is their symmetry. In both algorithms, every dissection partitions the composition into parts of the same size. In this section, we show that a better gain can be achieved by an asymmetric dissection.
We observe that the basic dissection attack on 4-encryption is asymmetric in its nature. Indeed, after the two separate MITM attacks are performed, the suggestions from the upper part are stored in a table, while the suggestions from the lower part are checked against the table values. As a result, the number of suggestions in the upper part is bounded from above by the size of the memory (which is now assumed to be 2 n and kept in sorted order), while the number of suggestions from the lower part can be arbitrarily large and generated on-the-fly in an arbitrary order. This suggests that an asymmetric dissection in which the lower part contains more rounds than the upper part, may result in a better algorithm. This is indeed the case, as illustrated by the following Dissect 3 (7, 1) algorithm (depicted in Figure 6: (1) Given 7 plaintext-ciphertext pairs (P 1 , C 1 ), (P 2 , C 2 ), . . . (P 7 , C 7 ), for each possible value of X 3 1 , X 3 2 , perform:
2 ) as the plaintext-ciphertext pairs, and obtain 2 n candidates for the keys (k 1 , k 2 , k 3 ). For each such candidate, partially encrypt the rest of the plaintexts using (k 1 , k 2 , k 3 ) and store the values (X 3 4 , . . . , X 3 7 ) in a sorted table, along with the corresponding key candidate
2 , C 2 ) as the plaintext-ciphertext pairs. Note that since only two pairs are given, the algorithm Dissect 2 (4, 1) produces a total of 2 2n possible values of the keys (k 4 , k 5 , k 6 , k 7 ). However, these values are produced sequentially, and can be checked on-the-fly by partially decrypting C 4 , C 5 , C 6 , C 7 , and checking whether the corresponding vector (X 3 4 , . . . , X 3 7 ) appears in the table. If so, retrieve the corresponding (k 1 , k 2 , k 3 ) and output the suggested key.
The memory complexity of the algorithm is 2 n , as both the basic MITM attack on triple encryption and the algorithm Dissect 2 (4, 1) require 2 n memory, and the size of the table computed in Step 1(a) is also 2 n . The time complexity is 2 4n . Indeed, two n-bit intermediate encryption values are enumerated, both the basic MITM attack on triple encryption and the algorithm Dissect 2 (4, 1) require 2 2n time, and the remaining 2 2n possible values of (k 4 , k 5 , k 6 , k 7 ) are checked instantly. This leads to a time complexity of 2 2n · 2 2n = 2 4n . The analysis shows that Gain(Dissect 3 (7, 1)) = 2, which is clearly better than the algorithms LogLayer r and Square r , for which the gain is only 1.
The algorithm Dissect 3 (7, 1) can be extended recursively to larger values of r, to yield a better asymptotical gain compared to the symmetric algorithms we presented. Given the algorithm Dissect j (r , 1) such that Gain(Dissect j (r , 1)) = −1, we define the algorithm Dissect 1 N EXT = Dissect +1 (r + + 1, 1) for r-encryption, where r = r + + 1, as follows: with (P 1 , X +1 1 ), . . . , (P , X +1 ) as the plaintext-ciphertext pairs, and obtain 2 n candidates for the keys (k 1 , . . . , k +1 ). For each such candidate, partially encrypt the rest of the plaintexts using (k 1 , . . . , k +1 ) and store the values (X +1 +1 , . . . , X +1 r ) in a sorted table, along with the corresponding key candidate
as the plaintext-ciphertext pairs. Check each of the 2 (r − )n suggestions for the keys (k +2 , . . . , k r ) on-the-fly by partially decrypting C +1 , . . . , C r , and checking whether the corresponding vector (X +1 +1 , . . . , X +1 r ) appears in the table. If so retrieve (k 1 , . . . , k + 1) from the table, and output the key guess.
An similar argument to the one used for Dissect 3 (7, 1) shows that the time and memory complexities of Dissect +1 (r) are 2 r n and 2 n , respectively, which implies that Gain(Dissect +1 (r)) = . In fact, Dissect 3 (7, 1) can be obtained from Dissect 2 (4, 1) by the recursive construction just described.
The recursion leads to a sequence of asymmetric dissection attacks with memory M = 2 n , such that the gain increases by 1 with each step of the sequence. Let r be the smallest number of rounds at with a gain of is achieved, then by the construction, the sequence satisfies the recursion r = r −1 + + 1, which (together with r 0 = 2 which follows from the basic MITM attack) leads to the formula:
The asymptotic gain of this sequence is obtained by representing as a function of r, and is equal to ( √ 8r − 7 − 3)/2 ≈ √ 2r, which is bigger than the √ r gain of the Square r algorithm.
The analysis presented in Section 3.5 shows that the algorithms obtained by the recursive sequence described above are the optimal amongst all dissection algorithms that split the r rounds into two (not necessarily equal) parts and attacks each part recursively, using any dissection algorithm.
We conclude that as far as only dissection attacks are concerned, the "magic sequence" of the minimal numbers of rounds for which the gains are = 0, 1, 2, 3, . . ., is: 4, 7, 11, 16, 22, 29, 37, 46, 56, . . 
.}.
This "magic sequence" will appear several more times in the sequel.
The Dissectu(r, 1) Algorithm
In this section, we present a formal treatment of the dissection algorithm and show the optimality of the sequence M agic 1 presented above for algorithms which use the following framework: In the outer loop of the algorithm, the adversary dissects E As explained in Section 3.4, the number of X u i values the adversary has to guess is dictated by the number of key suggestions for k 1 , k 2 , . . . , k u yielded by the attack on E [1...u] , since only these suggestions have to be stored in memory. Since the amount of memory allowed in Dissect u (r, 1) is 2 n , we assume that the adversary guesses u − 1 values of the form X u i , as this makes the number of suggestions 2 n (under standard randomness assumptions).
Therefore, the Dissect u (r, 1) attack on r-encryption can be defined as follows:
3.5.1. The Dissectu(r, 1) Algorithm:
(1) Given r plaintext-ciphertext pairs
. . , P r ) and store the result in a sorted table (along with the corresponding key candidate [u+1...r] is at most 2 n , then the memory complexity of the whole attack is 2 n (recall that we expect 2 n candidates for k 1 , k 2 , . . . , k u ). Moreover, for the right guess of the X table in Step 2(b). Hence, the attack indeed returns the right key (perhaps with a few other candidates).
The time complexity of the attack is 2 (u−1)n times the time complexity of Steps 1(a) and 1(b). The running time of Step 1(a) does not effect the proof of optimality of our algorithms, and thus we ignore it.
Using our framework, we assume that the most efficient way to implement Step 1(b) is by calling Dissect u * (r − u, 1) algorithm for some u * < r − u. Thus, the running time of Step 1(b) is at least the time complexity of the Dissect u * (r−u, 1) algorithm. In addition, one needs to note that the number of solutions suggested by this part of the attack is 2 (r−2u+1)n , i.e., we expect another 2 (r−2u+1)n accesses to the table as part of Step 1(b). For convenience of notation, let f 1 (r) min 1≤u≤r−1 {r − 1 − Gain(Dissect u (r, 1))}, so that the lowest possible time complexity of an algorithm in our framework on rencryption with 2 n memory is 2 f1(r)n . Using this notation, the time complexity of Dissect u (r, 1) is at least
Therefore, for a given value of r, the optimal value of u is the one that minimizes the above expression. In other words:
We can simplify this expression by plugging in u = r/2 , and obtaining f 1 (r) ≤ r/2 + 1 + f 1 ( r/2 ). Thus, since f 1 (r) is non-decreasing, the minimum cannot be obtained for u > r/2 , which implies:
Using Equation 2 and the known values of f 1 (1) = f 1 (2) = 1 (which follow from the standard MITM algorithm on 2-encryption), it is easy to show by induction on r that the minimal complexities are achieved by the sequence of algorithms presented in Section 3.4.
Remark 3.2. One may be concerned by the fact that when the algorithm is run recursively there are no additional "plaintext" values that allow constructing the table in
Step 1 (as we require at least one additional "plaintext" to filter some of the key candidates found in Step 2). This issue is solved by the fact that once the top part (being E [1...r * ] for some r * ) has at most 2 n possible keys, we can partially encrypt as many plaintexts as we have to generate the required data.
Deterministic Dissection Algorithms for m > 1
While the algorithms presented above seem tailored to the case m = 1, it turns out that a small tweak in the recursive sequence of the dissection algorithms presented in Section 3.4 is sufficient to obtain optimal algorithms in our framework for any integer 7 m > 1.
First, we define the general family of dissection algorithms Dissect u (r, m), which correspond to a memory complexity of 2 mn .
Given r plaintext-ciphertext pairs
(1) Obtain the 2 mn candidates for the keys k 1 , k 2 , . . . , k u given the plaintext-"ciphertext" pairs (
and store the result in a sorted table (along with the corresponding key candidate
for each such candidate, and check whether the corresponding value is in the table. If so, check the key candidate suggested by the value of the current candidate of k u+1 , k u+2 , . . . , k r and the value stored in the table for k 1 , k 2 , . . . , k u .
As in the case m = 1, we denote f m (r) = r − m − Gain D (r, m), so that the lowest possible time complexity of a deterministic dissection attack on r-encryption with 2 mn memory is 2 fm(r)n . In these notations, an exactly the same analysis as in the case m = 1 shows that
The optimal choice of the "cut points" u for each value of r is obtained by a recursive sequence of algorithms, which is a simple generalization of the sequence that we obtained for m = 1. First, note that if an algorithm Dissect j (r , m) satisfies Gain(Dissect j (r , m)) = −m, then the algorithm Dissect +m (r + +m, m) (which uses Dissect j (r , m) as a subroutine in the lower part) satisfies Gain(Dissect +m (r + + m, m)) = . This allows us to construct a recursive sequence of algorithms, in which the gain is increased by m at every step, thus generalizing the case of m = 1.
As the starting points for the sequence, we take the m algorithms Dissect m+i (2m + 2i, m) for i = 0, 1, . . . , m − 1. In the algorithm Dissect m+i (2m + 2i, m), the adversary enumerates i intermediate values after m + i rounds, applies simple MITM attacks on each part separately, and then applies a MITM attack between the 2 mn key suggestions from the two parts. The time and memory complexities of the algorithm are 2 (m+i)n and 2 mn , respectively, and hence, its gain is i. Using these m starting points and the recursive step, the entire sequence can be computed easily. It turns out that the "magic sequence" of the numbers of rounds at which the gain = 0, 1, 2, . . . is obtained is M agic m = {2m, 2m+2, 2m+4, . . . , 4m, 4m+3, 4m+6, . . . , 7m, 7m+4, 7m+8, . . . , 11m, . . .}, and the asymptotic gain is approximately √ 2mr. Using Equation (3), it is easy to show by induction on r that the optimal complexities amongst Dissect u (r, m) algorithms are achieved by the sequence of algorithms presented above.
We present the time and memory complexities of the optimal Dissect u (r, m) algorithms for all r ≤ 40 and m ≤ 10 in Table I .
Dissection Algorithms for a Composition of One-Way Functions
In this section, we consider compositions of one-way functions (OWFs), which appear in the context of layered Message Authentication Codes, such as NMAC [Bellare et al. 1996] . It turns out that the deterministic dissection algorithms presented above can be easily modified to yield efficient dissection algorithms for this scenario.
In the scenario of composition of OWFs, the goal is to retrieve k 1 , k 2 , . . . , k r used in
where F k (·) is a one-way-function from an n-bit input and an n-bit key into an n-bit output. Given 2 2n memory, one can simply store a table of (F k (X), k, X) sorted by the values of F k (X) and k. Thus, given F k (X) and k, one can find all possible X values (there is one such value on average) that are "encrypted" into F k (X) under the key k. As this actually generates the "decryption" functionality by one memory access per each possible X (and thus amortized complexity of one memory access per each (F k (X), k) tuple), we can repeat the same Dissect u (r, m) algorithms designed for multiple-encryption, if m ≥ 2.
In which comply with the known outputs. 10 Then, we obtain candidates for the keys in the upper part and check them against the table. This procedure is somewhat less efficient than the original Dissect u (r, m), but obtains similar asymptotical results.
In the simplest case of r = 3, the algorithm, which we call DissectOW F 2 (3), is defined as follows: 10 Different from the case of multiple encryption, in the case of one-way-functions, we build a table for the lower part of the cipher. 11 Recall that we discuss only the case in which 2 n memory is given, as for 2 2n memory the previous Dissect algorithms are still applicable. Hence, we omit the amount of memory from the notation.
(2) For every k 1 , k 2 , compute F k2 (F k1 (P 1 )) and check whether the obtained value X 2 1 appears in the table. If so, obtain test the key suggested by the match by checking whether F [1...3] (P 2 , P 3 ) = (C 2 , C 3 ).
Step 1 goes over 2 2n values, with an n-bit filtering condition. Hence, its running time is 2 2n and the expected memory consumption is 12 2 n .
Step 2 iterates over all 2 2n values of (k 1 , k 2 ), and for each such key pair, we expect on average one value of X 2 1 in the table. This value suggests on average a single value of k 3 , from which we obtain a suggestion for the complete key. We conclude that the time complexity of DissectOW F 2 (3) is 2 2n and its memory complexity is 2 n . We note that (similarly to the case of multiple-encryption) a trivial extension of DissectOW F 2 (3) allows to retrieve the key of a composition of r OWFs for any r ≥ 3, in time 2 (r−1)n and memory 2 n . Moreover, if we are given only r − 1 input/output pairs, the same algorithm allows to retrieve the 2 n keys which comply with these pairs. This algorithm will be used in the recursive step below.
Starting with DissectOW F 2 (3), we can recursively construct a sequence of dissection algorithms. The construction is similar to the Dissect N EXT construction presented above, with a few differences which follow from the special structure of OWFs.
Given ≥ 2 and an algorithm DissectOW F j (r ) such that Gain(DissectOW F j (r )) = − 1, we define the algorithm DissectOW F N EXT = DissectOW F r (r + + 1) for rencryption, where r = r + + 1, as follows:
Given r plaintext-ciphertext pairs (P 1 , C 1 ), (P 2 , C 2 ), . . . (P r , C r ), for each possible value of X r 1 , . . . , X r , perform:
(1) Apply the basic extension of the DissectOW F 2 (3) algorithm to E [r +1...r] with (X r 1 , C 1 ), . . . , (X r , C ) as the input-output pairs, and obtain 2 n candidates for the keys (k r +1 , . . . , k r ). For each such candidate, compute the preimages (X r +1 , . . . , X r r ) of (C +1 , . . . , C r ), by going over all possible inputs to E [r +1...r] , encrypting them with the (k r +1 , . . . , k r ) candidate, and storing the inputs whose corresponding outputs are (C +1 , . . . , C r ). Store them in a table, along with the corresponding key candidate (k 1 , . . . , k + 1).
(2) Apply the algorithm DissectOW F j (r ) to E [1...r ] with (P 1 , X r 1 ), . . . , (P , X r ) as the plaintext/ciphertext pairs. Check each of the 2 (r − )n suggestions for the keys (k 1 , . . . , k r ) on-the-fly by partially encrypting P +1 , . . . , P r , and checking whether the corresponding vector (X r +1 , . . . , X r r ) appears in the table. An analysis similar to that of the Dissect 1 N EXT algorithm presented above shows that the time and memory complexities of DissectOW F N EXT are T = 2 r n and M = 2 n . Indeed, the only essential difference between DissectOW F N EXT and Dissect 1 N EXT is the second part of Step 1 (i.e., computing the preimages), but the time complexity of this part is 2 2n , which is less than the complexity of the other steps of the algorithm, since ≥ 2.
This shows that the sequence of DissectOW F j (r) algorithms satisfies the same recursion relation as the sequence Dissect j (r, 1). Hence, if we denote byr the 'th element of the sequence (i.e., the number of rounds for which the gain is ), theñ r =r −1 + + 1.
12 A given output may have several inputs (even when the key is fixed), thus the number of "solutions" to the equation F k 3 (X 2 1 ) = C 1 may be higher than 2 n . However, assuming F (·) is a "good" one way function, the number of solutions is not expected to be significantly higher than 2 n .
Sincer 0 = 3, we get the formulã r = r + 1 = ( + 1)( + 2) 2 + 2.
Therefore, the "magic sequence" corresponding to a composition of OWFs is 5, 8, 12, 17, 23, . . .}, and the asymptotic gain is approximately √ 2r, as in the basic r-encryption case.
PARALLEL COLLISION SEARCH VIA DISSECTION
In Section 3, we only considered deterministic algorithms for r-encryption schemes which never err, that is, algorithms which find all the possible values of the keys which comply with the plaintext-ciphertext pairs, or prove that there are no such keys. For this type of algorithm, we improved the previously best known generic tradeoff curve (obtained by MITM attacks) from T M = 2 rn to T M = 2 (r− √ 2r)n using our dissection algorithms.
We now also consider non-deterministic algorithms which find the right keys with some probability p < 1, which can be made arbitrarily close to one (i.e., Monte Carlo algorithms). In this case, an improved tradeoff curve of T 2 M = 2 (3/2)rn can be obtained by the parallel collision search algorithm of van Oorschot and Wiener [van Oorschot and Wiener 1996] . In this section, we combine the dissection algorithms presented in Section 3 with the parallel collision search algorithm to obtain an even better tradeoff curve with a multiplicative gain of at least 2 Table II .
Brief Description of the Parallel Collision Search Algorithm
We start with a brief description of the Parallel Collision Search (PCS) algorithm of van Oorschot and Wiener [van Oorschot and Wiener 1996] . For more information on the algorithm and its applications, the reader is referred to the original paper [van Oorschot and Wiener 1996] . 4.1.1. The Memoryless Algorithm. The simplest way to present the PCS algorithm is to consider "memoryless" (i.e., constant memory) attacks on r-encryption. As mentioned in Section 3, the time complexity of exhaustive search is 2 rn , and the MITM attack does not perform better given constant memory. Van Oorschot and Wiener showed that the time complexity can be reduced to 2 (3/4)rn , using the PCS algorithm. The basic observation behind the algorithm is that given constant memory, one can efficiently find key candidates which comply with half of the plaintext-ciphertext pairs.
Assume, for sake of simplicity, than r is even and the adversary is given r plaintext-ciphertext pairs (P 1 , C 1 ), . . . , (P r , C r ). The first step of the PCS algorithm consists of finding candidates for the keys (k 1 , . . . , k r ), which comply with the pairs (P 1 , C 1 ) , . . . , (P r/2 , C r/2 ). In order to find them, the adversary constructs the two step and uses a variant of Floyd's cycle finding algorithm [Knuth 1981 ] to find a collision between them. Thus, the adversary obtains a value of (k 1 , . . . , k r/2 , k r/2+1 , . . . , k r ) which complies with (P 1 , C 1 ), . . . , (P r/2 , C r/2 ). As both functions are from (r/2)n bits to (r/2)n bits, Floyd's algorithm is expected to find a collision in time 2 (r/4)n , with constant memory. In the sequel, we call such collisions partial collisions.
In the second step of the algorithm, the adversary checks whether the found key candidate also complies with the pairs (P r/2+1 , C r/2+1 ), . . . , (P r , C r ). By standard randomness assumptions, this occurs with probability 2 −(r/2)n , and hence adversary is expected to find the key after testing 2 (r/2)n candidates. The total time complexity of the algorithm is thus 2 (3/4)rn . We note that one may be tempted to use the naive approach to find a collision between F upper and F lower , by trying to construct a self-colliding chain of values, generated by alternating the applications of the two functions on the current value. However, this approach does not work, and in order to efficiently obtain the desired collision, one has to embed pseudo-randomness into the generation of the chain in order to decide at each stage which of the functions to apply next (for more details, refer to [van Oorschot and Wiener 1996] ). Moreover, the adversary has to use different flavors of the step functions F upper and F lower in order to produce the 2 (r/2)n distinct partial collisions required for the second step of the algorithm. Thus, the algorithm is probabilistic also in the sense that its success probability depends on the (randomly chosen) starting points of Floyd's algorithm and the different flavors.
A Time/Memory
Tradeoff. If more memory is available, then the algorithm described above can be combined with the techniques used in the classical Hellman's time-memory tradeoff attack [Hellman 1980 ] to obtain the tradeoff curve T 2 M = 2 (3/2)rn . The reduction in the time complexity is achieved by obtaining many partial collisions simultaneously, with a lower amortized time per collision.
Assume that the available memory is M = 2 mn . The adversary chooses M random starting points V i , and for each of them she computes a chain of values starting from V i . Each chain is terminated once a value with (r/4 − m/2)n zero LSBs is obtained, and this "distinguished point" is stored in a table, along with V i and its total length. For each reached distinguished point, she checks whether it already appears in the table. If it indeed appears, then the corresponding chains give a collision between F lower and F upper with high probability. This collision can be easily found using the two starting points of the chains, and their lengths.
The expected length of each of the 2 mn paths is 2 (r/4−m/2)n , and thus the structure covers a total of about 2 (r/4+m/2)n values. Using the birthday paradox, since every path contains about 2 (r/4−m/2)n values, we expect it to collide with at least one of the 2 (r/4+m/2)n covered points with high probability. Thus, we expect to find a total of about 2 mn partial collisions using this algorithm. Generating the structure requires a total of about 2 (r/4+m/2)n operations, and we can obtain each of the 2 mn partial collisions in about 2 (r/4−m/2)n time (the expected length of a chain in the structure). Thus, the total time complexity of obtaining the collisions is about 2 (r/4+m/2)n , which implies that the time complexity of the algorithm is also about 2 (r/4+m/2)n . In total, the algorithm requires about 2 (r/4+m/2)n operations in order to find 2 mn partial collisions. Since 2 rn/2 partial collisions are needed, the overall time complexity is T = 2 (r/4+m/2)n · 2 (r/2−m)n = 2 (3r/4−m/2)n , which leads to the tradeoff curve T 2 M = 2 (3/2)rn .
The Dissect & Collide Algorithm
In this section, we present the Dissect & Collide (DC) algorithm, which uses dissection to enhance the PCS algorithm. The basic idea behind the DC algorithm is that it is possible to fix several intermediate values after r/2 rounds, (X r/2 1 , . . . , X r/2 u ), and construct complex step functionsF upper andF lower in such a way that all the keys they suggest partially en- (P 1 , C 1 ) , . . . , (P r/2 , C r/2 ) can be found at the smaller "cost" than finding a collision which complies only with (P u+1 , C u+1 ), . . . , (P r/2 , C r/2 ). It should be noted that this gain could potentially be diminished by the "cost" of the new step functionsF , which is higher than the "cost" of the simple step functions F . However, we show that when the efficient dissection algorithms presented in Section 3 are used to attack the subciphers E [1...r/2] and E [r/2+1...r] , the gain is bigger than the loss, and the resulting DC algorithm is faster than the PCS algorithm (given the same amount of memory).
A Basic Example:
Applying DC to 8-encryption. As the idea of the DC algorithm is somewhat involved, we illustrate it by considering the simple case (r = 8, m = 1). In the case of 8-encryption, the goal of the first step in the PCS algorithm is to find partial collisions which comply with the pairs (P 1 , C 1 ), . . . , (P 4 , C 4 ). Given memory of 2 n , the average time in which the PCS find each such collision is 2 1.5n . The DC algorithm allows to achieve the same goal in 2 n average time. In the DC algorithm, we fix three intermediate values: (X Recall that the algorithm Dissect 2 (4, 1) presented in Section 3 allows to retrieve all 2 n values of (k 1 , k 2 , k 3 , k 4 ) which comply with the pairs (P 1 , X 4 1 ), (P 2 , X 4 2 ), (P 3 , X 4 3 ) in time 2 2n and memory 2 n . Furthermore, given a fixed value X 2 1 , there is a single value of (k 1 , k 2 , k 3 , k 4 ) (on average) which complies with the three plaintext-ciphertext pairs and the X 2 1 value, and this value can be found in time 2 n (since the Dissect 2 (4, 1) algorithm starts with guessing the value X 2 1 and then performs only 2 n operations for each guess). Given plaintexts (P 1 , P 2 , P 3 , P 4 ), their corresponding ciphertexts (C 1 , C 2 , C 3 , C 4 ), and a guess for (X Given plaintexts (P 1 , P 2 , P 3 , P 4 ) and (C 1 , C 2 , C 3 , C 4 ), the algorithm works as follows:
(1) For each value of a value of (X (a) Use the Hellman-like data structure of the PCS algorithm to find 2 n partial collisions betweenF upper andF lower , given the M = 2 n available memory. (b) For each partial collision, if the suggested (k 1 , . . . , k 4 , k 5 , . . . , k 8 ) encrypts (P 5 , . . . , P 8 ) to (C 5 , . . . , C 8 ), return the full key.
By the construction of the step functions, each suggested key (k 1 , . . . , k 4 ) (or (k 5 , . . . , k 8 )) encrypts (P 1 , P 2 , P 3 ) to (X C 1 ) , . . . , (P 4 , C 4 ). Since we find 2 n collisions in step 1(a), we expect a collision for each possible value of X 4 4 . Thus, once we iterate over the correct value of (X 4 1 , X 4 2 , X 4 3 ), we expect a collision on the correct value of X 4 4 , which will suggest the correct key with high probability.
Since the step functions are from n bits to n bits, we can find the required 2 n partial collisions with 2 n invocation using 2 n memory in Step 1(a). By the properties of the algorithm Dissect 2 (4, 1) mentioned above, the invocation of the step functionsF can be performed in 2 n time and memory. Thus, steps 1(a) and 1(b) require a total of 2 2n time, and the total running time of the algorithm is 2 4n−n · 2 2n = 2 5n . We note that while our DC algorithm outperforms the respective PCS algorithm (whose time complexity is 2 5.5n ), it has the same performance as the Dissect 4 (8, 1) algorithm presented in Section 3. However, as we show in the sequel, for larger values of r, the DC algorithms significantly outperform the Dissect algorithms.
The
General DC(r, m) Algorithms. We are now ready to give a formal definition of the DC(r, m) class of algorithms, applicable to r-encryption (for an even r), 13 given memory of 2
mn . An algorithm A ∈ DC(r, m) is specified by a number u, 1 ≤ u ≤ r/2, and two sets and the set I lower . The adversary finds 2 mn collision betweenF upper and F lower using a Hellman-like data structure, where each collision gives a suggestion of (k 1 , . . . , k r/2 , k r/2+1 , . . . , k r ), complying with the plaintext-ciphertext pairs (P 1 , C 1 ), . . . , (P r/2 , C r/2 ).
Denote the time complexity of each application ofF by S = 2
sn . An easy computation shows that the overall time complexity of the algorithm DC(r, m) is:
As the time complexity of the PCS algorithm with memory 2 mn is 2 ((3/4)r−m/2)n , the multiplicative gain of the DC algorithm is 2 (u/2−s)n . In particular, for the specific DC(8, 1) algorithm described above for 8-encryption, we have s = 1, and thus, the gain is indeed 2 (3/2−1)n = 2 n/2 . In the sequel, we denote the parameters I upper , I lower , u, s which specify a DC(r, m) algorithm A and determine its time complexity by I upper (A), I lower (A), u(A), and s(A), respectively.
Flavors in the
Step Function of the Algorithm DC. We conclude this section by pointing out a difficulty in the implementation of the DC algorithm (which does not exist in the PCS algorithm) and presenting a way to resolve it.
Recall that in the PCS algorithm, for each value of (k 1 , . . . , k r/2 ), there is exactly one corresponding value of F upper (k 1 , . . . , k r/2 ) = (X fraction of the cases, the step functionF upper returns no value, and thus, the expected length of its generated chains is constant! In order to resolve this difficulty, we introduce flavors into the definition of the step function. Formally, for each value of I upper ,F upper (I upper ) is a (possibly empty) multiset. Based on this, we define:
where i 0 ∈ {0, 1} (r/2−u)n is minimal such that the set {F upper (I upper ⊕i 0 )} is non-empty, and the minimums are taken with respect to the lexicographic order. In other words, if the setF upper (I upper ) is empty, then we replace I upper by I upper ⊕ (0, 0, . . . , 0, 1) and computeF upper again. We continue until we reach a value of i 0 for which the set of outputs ofF upper is non-empty, and the single outputF upper (I upper ) is chosen from this set as according to some lexicographical order. The same modification is applied also toF lower . Using this modification, the step function becomes uniquely defined as in the case of PCS, and the computation overhead required by the new definition is small, since the output ofF upper is non-empty for an 1 − 1/e fraction of the inputs. Another difficulty which does not arise in the original PCS algorithm, is the possibility that in an execution of the algorithm with correct values of the r/2 − u fixed intermediate values, the correct key will not be found since the set of outputs of the correctF upper contains more than one solution. Since the algorithm is forced to pick only one solution, it may miss the correct key. To deal with this possibility, if we do not find the key in an execution of the algorithm, we change the ordering algorithm of the solutions and run it again. Since we expect no more than a few solutions in each execution of the step functions, we expect to repeat the algorithm only a small number of times. After these modifications, which result in a small (constant) penalty in its time complexity, we can claim that the success probability of the DC algorithm can be made arbitrarily close to 1 (similarly to the PCS algorithm).
The Gain of the Dissect & Collide Algorithm Over the PCS Algorithm
In this section, we consider several natural extensions of the basic DC(8, 1) algorithm presented in Section 4.2. We use these extensions to show that the gain of the DC algorithms over the PCS algorithm is monotone, non-decreasing with r and is lower bounded by √ 2r /8 for any r ≥ 8. Before we present the extensions of the basic DC algorithm, we formally define the notion of gain in the non-deterministic setting. As the best previously known algorithm in this setting is the PCS algorithm, whose time complexity given 2 mn memory is 2 ((3/4)r−m/2)n , we define the gain with respect to it.
Definition 4.1. The gain of a probabilistic algorithm A for r-encryption whose time and memory complexities are T and M = 2 mn , respectively, is defined as
The maximal gain amongst all probabilistic DC algorithms for r-encryption which require 2 mn memory, is denoted by Gain N D (r, m).
Note that it follows from Equation (4) that if A ∈ DC(r, m), then
4.3.1. Monotonicity of the gain. The simplest extension of the basic DC algorithm preserves the gain when additional "rounds" are added. While in the deterministic case, such an extension can be obtained trivially by guessing several keys and applying the previous algorithm, in our setting this approach leads to a decrease of the gain by 1/2 for each two added rounds (as the complexity of the PCS algorithm is increased by a factor of 2 3n/2 when r is increased by 2). However, the gain can be preserved in another way, as shown in the following lemma. LEMMA 4.2. Assume that an algorithm A ∈ DC(r , m) has gain . Then there exists an algorithm B ∈ DC(r + 2, m) whose gain is also equal to . , . . . , X (r +2)/2 (r +2)/2 ). It is clear that Step 1 of the algorithm requires at most 2 n operations, Steps 2 and 4 require at most r operations each, and Step 3 requires 2 sn operations. Hence, if s ≥ 1 (which is the case for all DC algorithms), the time complexity of Step(B) is indeed equal to that of Step(A). The same argument applies also to the functionF lower . Finally, it is clear that the memory requirement of B is equal to the memory requirement of A, which completes the proof.
PROOF. Recall that the sets of intermediate values fixed in the algorithm
Lemma 4.2 implies that the gain of the DC algorithms is monotone non-decreasing with r, and in particular, that Gain N D (r, 1) ≥ 1/2, for any even r ≥ 8.
4.3.
2. An analogue of the LogLayer algorithm. The next natural extension of the basic DC algorithm is an analogue of the LogLayer algorithm presented in Section 3.3. Recall that the LogLayer r algorithm, applicable when r is a power of 2, consists of guessing the set of intermediate values: log r−1 }, and applying a recursive sequence of MITM attacks on 2-encryption. Using this algorithm, we can define the algorithm LL r ∈ DC(2r, 1), by specifying I upper (LL r ) = I 0 , and I lower (LL r ) in a similar way. Since |I 0 | = r−log r−1, we have u(LL r ) = r−(r−log r−1) = log r + 1. It follows from the structure of the LogLayer r algorithm that given the values in I 0 , it can compute the keys (k 1 , . . . , k r ) in time and memory of 2 n . Hence, we have s(LL r ) = 1. By Equation (5), it follows that Gain(LL r ) = (log r + 1)/2 − 1 = (log r − 1)/2.
The basic algorithm for 8-encryption is the special case of this algorithm LL 4 . The next two values of r also yield interesting algorithms: LL 8 yields gain of 1 for (r = 16, m = 1), which amounts to an attack on 16-encryption with (T = 2 10.5n , M = 2 n ), and LL 16 yields gain of 1.5 for (r = 32, m = 1), which amounts to an attack on 32-encryption with (T = 2 22n , M = 2 n ). Both attacks outperform the Dissect attacks and are the best known attacks on 16-encryption and on 32-encryption, respectively.
3. An analogue of the Squarer algorithm:. The logarithmic asymptotic gain of the LL sequence can be significantly outperformed by an analogue of the Square r algorithm, presented in Section 3.3. Recall that the Square r algorithm, applicable when r = (r ) 2 is a perfect square, starts by guessing the set of (r − 1) 2 intermediate encryption values:
and then performs a two-layer attack, which amounts to r + 1 separate attacks on r -encryption. Using this algorithm, we can define the algorithm Sq r ∈ DC(2r, 1), by specifying I upper (Sq r ) = I 1 , and I lower (Sq r ) in a similar way. Since |I 1 | = (r − 1) 2 , we have u(Sq r ) = r − (r − 1) 2 = 2r − 1. The step complexity s(Sq r ) is the time complexity required for attacking r -encryption without fixed intermediate values. Hence, by Equation (5),
where 2 f1(r)n is the time complexity of our best attack on r-encryption with 2 n memory.
The basic algorithm for 8-encryption is the special case Sq 2 of this algorithm. Since for small values of r , the best known attacks on r -encryption are obtained by the dissection attacks presented in Section 3.4, the next elements of the sequence Sq r which increase the gain, correspond to the next elements of the sequence M agic 1 = {1, 2, 4, 7, 11, 16, . . .} described in Section 3.4. They lead to gains of 1.5, 2.5, and 3.5 for r = 32, 98, and r = 242, respectively. For large values of r, the PCS algorithm outperforms the Dissect algorithms, and using it we obtain:
This shows that the asymptotic gain of the DC algorithms is at least √ 2r/8. We note that as for r ≥ 16, the DC algorithm outperforms both the Dissect and the PCS algorithms, we can use it instead of PCS in the attacks on r -encryption in order to increase the gain for large values of r. However, as the gain of DC over PCS for r -encryption is only of order O( √ r ) = O(r 1/4 ), the addition to the overall gain of Sq r is negligible.
4.3.4. Two-layer DC algorithms. A natural extension of the Sq r algorithm is the class of two-layer DC algorithms. Assume that r = 2r 1 · r 2 , and that there exist algorithms A 1 , A 2 for r 1 -encryption and for r 2 -encryption, respectively, both of which perform in time 2 sn and memory 2 n given sets of intermediate values I , respectively.
Then we can define an algorithm A ∈ DC(r, 1) whose step function is computed by a two-layer algorithm: First, E [1...r/2] is divided into r 2 subciphers of r 1 rounds each, and the algorithm A 1 is used to attack each of them separately and compute 2 n possible suggestions for each set of r 1 consecutive keys. Then, each r 1 -round encryption is considered as a single encryption with 2 n possible keys, and the algorithm A 2 is used to attack the resulting r 2 -encryption. The set I upper (A) is chosen such that both A 1 and A 2 algorithms perform in time 2
sn . Formally, if we denote u 1 = |I . The set I lower (A) is defined similarly. Hence,
Note that the algorithm Sq r is actually a two-layer DC algorithm, with r 1 = r 2 = r and I upper 1 = I upper 2 = ∅. It turns out that for all 8 ≤ r ≤ 128, our maximal gains are obtained by two-layer DC algorithms where r 1 , r 2 are chosen from the sequence M agic 1 presented in Section 3.4, and A 1 , A 2 are the respective Dissect algorithms. The cases of r = 8, 16, 32 presented above are obtained with r 1 = 4 and r 2 = 1, 2, 4 (respectively), and the next numbers of rounds in which the gain increases are r = 56, 88, 128, obtained for r 1 = 4 and r 2 = 7, 11, 16, respectively. The continuation of the "non-deterministic magic sequence" is, however, more complicated. For example, the two-layer algorithm for r = 176 with (r 1 = 4, r 2 = 22) has the same gain as the algorithm with (r 1 = 4, r 2 = 16), and the next increase of the gain occurs only for r = 224, and is obtained by a two-layer algorithm with (r 1 = 7, r 2 = 16). For larger values of r, more complex algorithms, such as a three-layer algorithm with r 1 = r 2 = r 3 = 7 for 686-encryption, outperform the two-layer algorithms. We leave the analysis of the whole magic sequence as an open problem, and conclude that using the two-layer algorithms, the minimal numbers of rounds for which the gain equals 0.5, 1, 1.5, 2, . . . are: 16, 32, 56, 88, 128 , . . .}. Finally, we note that a similar analysis to that presented in Section 3.6 shows that two-layer DC algorithms can be applied also for m > 1, and can be used to show that the first numbers of rounds for which Gain N D (r, m) = 0.5, 1, 1.5, 2, . . . are: 16m, 16m+16, 16m+32 , . . . , 32m, 32m+24, 32m+48, . . . , 56m, . . .}. We give in Table II a comparison between the time complexities of the Dissect, PCS, and DC algorithms.
APPLICATIONS
In this section, we apply our new dissection algorithms to two well known search problems, which demonstrate different features of the algorithms -Rubik's cube and the knapsack problem. In each of the problems, the application of the technique consists of two stages: first, we find a way to represent the problem as a bicomposite problem, and then we choose the best appropriate dissection algorithm to solve it.
In the case of Rubik's cube, presented in Section 5.1, the main effort is to represent the problem in a bicomposite form, and then it becomes equivalent to r-encryption with r = 20. Afterwards, several dissection algorithms that can be mounted, and Table I gives the complexities of some of them, for various choices of m. One of these algorithms has time and memory complexities of T ≈ 2 40 and M ≈ 2 20 , respectively, which is completely practical. The complexities match the complexities of a 25-years old algorithm of Fiat et al. [Fiat et al. 1989 ], which was highly specific and depended on the group-theoretic properties of the set of permutations defined by Rubik's cube.
In the case of the knapsack problem, presented in Section 5.2, the bicomposite representation is easy, and moreover we have a freedom to choose the value of r, in order to optimize the complexities. By using different choices of r and m, we obtain a complete tradeoff curve between the time and memory complexities, which is better than the best previously known curve obtained by Becker et al. [Becker et al. 2011 ] for all 2 n/100 ≤ M ≤ 2 n/6 . We note that the analyses of all our algorithms assume a uniform distribution of solutions. However, in the case of knapsacks, our deterministic algorithms can be adapted (with only a small memory overhead) to deal with cases where the distri-bution of solutions is far from uniform, as shown in the follow-up paper [Austrin et al. 2013] .
Application to Rubik's Cube
Rubik's Cube is a 3-dimensional combination puzzle invented in 1974 by Ernő Rubik. In a classic Rubik's Cube, each of the six faces is covered by nine stickers, each of one of six solid colours (traditionally white, red, blue, orange, green, and yellow, where white is opposite to yellow, blue is opposite to green, and orange is opposite to red, and the red, white and blue are arranged in that order in a clockwise arrangement). An internal pivot mechanism enables each face to turn independently, thus mixing up the colours. For the puzzle to be solved, each face should be composed of a single color (as in the initial state), and the quality of the solution is determined by the number of "moves" (i.e., face turns) required for transforming the (random) initial state to the final state.
Finding a solution is easy, and there are many algorithms which had been described in the recreational mathematics literature to achieve this (some of which are described in [Slocum 2011]) . However, these algorithms are typically quite wasteful, using between 50 and 100 moves in order to transform subcubes to their correct positions, one at a time, in some fixed order, ignoring the effect of these actions on other subcubes. Some algorithms use fewer moves, but then they are much harder to describe since they require a very detailed case analysis of the full state before choosing the first move. Recently, [Davidson et al. 2010] proved that 20 moves are necessary and sufficient if we want to solve any solvable state of Rubik's cube, but this was an existential result and the authors did not present an efficient way to actually find such a sequence. Note that the number of possible sequences of 20 moves is 18 20 = 12748236216396078174437376 ≈ 2 83 , but we can slightly reduce the size of the search space to 18 · 15 19 = 399030807609558105468750 ≈ 2 78 by noticing that there is no point in rotating the same face twice in a row. However, even this reduced size cannot be exhaustively searched in a feasible amount of time.
The best currently known algorithm for untangling any solvable state of Rubik's cube in 20 moves was presented at FOCS 1989 by Fiat et al. [Fiat et al. 1989] . It is specific to the problem, and crucially depends on the group-theoretic properties of the set of permutations defined by Rubik's cube. The algorithm achieves time and memory complexities of around 2 40 and 2 20 , respectively. In this section we show how to apply the dissection algorithms to the Rubik's cube puzzle, obtaining the same time and memory complexities as in [Fiat et al. 1989 ] with a generic algorithm, that does not use any specific property of Rubik's cube.
5.1.1. Representing Rubik's Cube as a Bicomposite Problem. We can assume that we always hold the cube in a fixed orientation, in which the white center color is at the top, the yellow center color is on the left, etc. One of the 27 subcubes is at the center of the cube, and we can ignore it since it is completely invisible. The six subcubes at the center of each face are not moved when we rotate that (or any other) face, and thus we can ignore them as well in our state representation. The actions we can take are to rotate each one of the six faces of the cube by 90 degrees, 180 degrees, or 270 degrees (we are not allowed to rotate a center slice since this will change the standard orientation of the cube defined above). Consequently, we have a repertoire of 18 atomic actions we can apply to each state of the cube. Note that all these actions are invertible mappings on the state of Rubik's cube in the sense that the inverse of a 90 degree rotation is a 270 degree rotation applied to the same face, and both of them are available as atomic actions.
Among the 27 − 6 − 1 = 20 subcubes which we can move, 12 have two visible colors and are called edge subcubes, and 8 have three visible colors and are called corner subcubes. Each such subcube can be uniquely described by the combination of colors on it, such as a blue-white (BW) edge subcube, or a green-orange-red (GOR) corner subcube. In addition, each location on the cube can be described by its relevant sides (i.e., a combination of top/bottom, left/right, front/back). We can thus describe any state of the cube by a vector of length 20, whose i-th entry describes the current location of the i-th subcube (e.g., the first entry in the vector will always refer to the blue-green edge subcube, and specify that it is currently located at the top-front position). To complete the specification, we also have to choose some standard orientation of the colors, and note that edge subcubes can be either in the standard (e.g., BW) or in an inverted (e.g., WB) state, and each corner subcube can be in one of three possible orientations (e.g., GOR, ORG, or GOR). Note that any possible action can only move edge subcubes to edge subcubes and corner subcubes to corner subcubes. If we use the first 12 positions in the state vector to describe the current locations of the 12 edge subcubes (in some fixed order), then each entry in these positions can be described by a number between 1 and 24 (specifying in which one of the 12 possible positions it is currently located and in which one of its 2 possible orientations). Similarly, when we use the last 8 positions in the state vector to describe the current locations of the 8 corner subcubes (in some fixed order), then each one of these entries can again contain a number between 1 and 24, this time specifying in which one of the 8 possible positions it is located and in which of its 3 possible orientations. We can thus describe any state of Rubik's cube by a vector of length 20 whose entries are numbers between 1 and 24. Any one of the 18 atomic actions will change 8 of the entries in this vector by moving 4 edge subcubes and 4 corner subcubes to new positions and orientations, leaving the remaining 12 entries unchanged.
Corner Edge Fig. 7 . A Rubik's Cube
The problem of solving Rubik's cube can now be formalized as the following search problem: We are given one vector of length 20 (representing the initial scrambled state of the cube) and a second vector of length 20 (representing the standard unscrambled state of the cube). We would like to find a sequence of atomic actions (in the form of face rotations) that will change the first vector into the second vector.
To show that our representation of the search problem is bicomposite, assume that we know the current location and orientation of a particular subcube (namely, we know the value of S i−1,j in the execution matrix as a number between 1 and 24), and we apply to it some known face rotation action. We can then uniquely determine the new location and orientation of that particular subcube (namely, the value of S i,j ) even when we know nothing about the current location and orientation of any other subcube (namely, all the other S k, values in the execution matrix). Notice that many other natural representations of the states of Rubik's cube do not have such a bicomposite structure. For example, if we associate the first entry in the state vector with a particular cube position (such as top-front) and use it to denote which edge subcube (such as BW) is currently located in it and in which orientation, then knowledge of just this entry in the first state does not tell us anything about which edge subcube (such as GR) replaces it at the top-front position if we rotate the top face by 90 degrees. Such a representation requires knowledge of other columns in the execution matrix, depending on which action was applied to the state, and thus we cannot use it in our new dissection technique.
5.1.2. Dissecting Rubik's Cube. Given the bicomposite representation described above, the problem of finding for any given initial state of Rubik's cube a sequence of up to 20 face rotations, is equivalent to the problem of recovering the keys in r-encryption, with r = 20 and n = log 2 (18). Hence, using Table I, and M = 2 3n ≈ 2 12 , etc. The algorithm obtained for m = 5 matches the complexities of the best previous known algorithm for this problem, by Fiat et al. [Fiat et al. 1989 ], while being completely generic and making no use of the details of the problem besides its bicompositeness. In order to give a concrete example of our technique, we present this algorithm in detail.
The main idea of the algorithm (as described in Section 3) is to "dissect" the execution matrix in the middle by iterating over all the possible values of some part of the middle state S 10 . The size of the partial S 10 that we iterate on is chosen such that it contains about 2 rn/4 ≈ 2 20 partial states. Since S 10 is represented as a 20-entry vector, where each entry can attain 24 values, we choose to iterate over its first 4 entries, which can assume 24 4 ≈ 2 18.5 values. For each such partial value of S 10 , we use the bicomposite structure of the problem in order to independently work on the two partial execution matrices shown in Figure 8 as red and blue rectangles, and finally join the partial solutions in order to obtain the full action vector.
The complete details of the algorithm are given in Figure 9 . We have an outer loop which iterates over all the possible values of S 10,1 , S 10,2 , S 10,3 , S 10,4 . Assuming that this value is correctly guessed, we first concentrate on the upper part of the execution matrix and find all the partial action vectors a 1 , . . . , a 10 which transform S 0,1 , S 0,2 , S 0,3 , S 0,4 into S 10,1 , S 10,2 , S 10,3 , S 10,4 . This is done using a simple MITM algorithm on this smaller execution matrix. For each solution a 1 , . . . , a 10 that we obtain using the MITM algorithm, we apply its actions to the full state S 0 , obtain a candidate value for the full S 10 state, and store it next to a 1 , . . . , a 10 in a list. After the MITM algorithm populates the list, we sort it (e.g., in lexicographic order) according to the value of S 10 .
We now focus on the bottom execution matrix and find all the partial action vectors a 11 , . . . , a 20 which transform S 10,1 , S 10,2 , S 10,3 , S 10,4 into S 20,1 , S 20,2 , S 20,3 , S 20,4 . We use the same idea that we used for the upper part, i.e., we execute a MITM algorithm on the bottom execution matrix. For each solution a 11 , . . . , a 20 that we obtain, we apply its inverse actions to S 20 and obtain a value for S 10 . Then, we check for matches for S 10 in the sorted list, and for each match, we output a full solution a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a 20 .
In order to analyze the algorithm, we fix a value of S 10,1 , S 10,2 , S 10,3 , S 10,4 and estimate the average number of solutions that we expect for the upper (smaller) execution matrix. Namely, we calculate the expected number of action vectors a 1 , . . . , a 10 which transform S 0,1 , S 0,2 , S 0,3 , S 0,4 into S 10,1 , S 10,2 , S 10,3 , S 10,4 . First, we notice that the number of possible action vectors a 1 , . . . , a 10 is about 2 39 . Each such action vector transforms S 0,1 , S 0,2 , S 0,3 , S 0,4 into an arbitrary partial state which matches S 10,1 , S 10,2 , S 10,3 , S 10,4 with probability of about 1/(24 4 ) ≈ 2 −18.5 (which is inverseproportional to the number of possible values of S 10,1 , S 10,2 , S 10,3 , S 10,4 ). Thus, the S20 S19 S15 S10 S5 S0 S1 . In general, the time complexity of the MITM algorithm is about square root of the search space, and thus its time complexity on the upper execution matrix is about 2 40/2 = 2 20 . However, since we could not guess an integral number of entries in S 10 , which can obtain exactly 2 20 values, we expect 2 21.5 solutions (which we enumerate and store), and the time complexity is slightly increased to 2 21.5 . This is also the expected time complexity of the MITM algorithm on the bottom part (although here we do not store the solutions, but immediately check each one of them). Since we have an outer loop which we execute 24 4 ≈ 2 18.5 times, the expected time complexity of the full algorithm is about 2 18.5+21.5 = 2 40 . The expected memory complexity is 2 21.5 , required in order to store the solutions for the MITM on the upper part (note that we reuse this memory for each guess of S 0,1 , S 0,2 , S 0,3 , S 0,4 ). 14 14 We note that for some of the values of S 10,1 , S 10,2 , S 10,3 , S 10,4 , the number of solutions for the MITM on the upper part will be larger than the average. We can overcome this problem by slightly increasing either the time or the memory complexity of our attack (since the distribution of states of Rubik's cube after an arbitrary sequence of 10 moves is close to uniform, we expect that the number of solutions would not deviate too much from the mean).
Algorithm DISSECT4-Rubik
Input: An initial state S 0 and a final state S 20 for all S 10,1 , S 10,2 , S 10,3 , S 10,4 do Obtain all candidate (a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a 10 ) satisfying S 10,1 , S 10,2 , S 10,3 , S 10,4 = a 10 (· · · a 2 (a 1 (S 0,1 , S 0,2 , S 0,3 , S 0,4 )) · · · ) by calling PartialMITM(S 0,1 , S 0,2 , S 0,3 , S 0,4 , S 10,1 , S 10,2 , S 10,3 , S 10,4 ) for all obtained a 1 , a 2 
Application to Knapsacks
The knapsack problem is defined as follows: given a list of n positive integers x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n of n bits and an additional n-bit positive integer S, find a vector =
Knapsack is a well-known problem that has been studied for many years. For more than 30 years, the best known algorithm for knapsacks was the Schroeppel-Shamir algorithm [Schroeppel and Shamir 1981] , which requires 2 n/2 time and 2 n/4 memory. In 2010, Howgrave-Graham and Joux [Howgrave-Graham and Joux 2010] showed how to solve the knapsack problem in time much smaller than 2 n/2 , using a specialized algorithm (which does not apply if the addition is replaced by a non-commutative operation, such as the rotations in the Rubik's cube problem). The specialized algorithm of [Howgrave-Graham and Joux 2010] was further improved by Becker, Coron and Joux in [Becker et al. 2011] . In addition to their basic results, these papers also presented reduced-memory algorithms, and in particular a memoryless attack which requires only 2 0.72n time. All these attacks are heuristic in a sense that they may fail to find a solution even when it exists, and thus they cannot be used in order to prove the nonexistence of solutions. In addition to these heuristic algorithms, Becker, Coron and Joux [Becker et al. 2011 ] also considered deterministic algorithms that never err, and obtained a straight-line time-memory tradeoff curve of T M = 2 3n/4 , for all 2 n/16 ≤ M ≤ 2 n/4 . In this section, we show how to use our generic dissection techniques in order to find deterministic algorithms for the knapsack problem which are better than the deterministic tradeoff curve described in [Becker et al. 2011 ] over the whole range of 2 n/16 < M < 2 n/4 . In addition, we can expand our tradeoff curve in a continuous way for any smaller value of M ≤ 2 n/4 . By combining our generic deterministic and non-deterministic algorithms, we obtain a new curve which is better than the best knapsack-specific algorithms described in [Howgrave-Graham and Joux 2010] and [Becker et al. 2011] for the large interval of (approximately) 2 n/100 ≤ M < 2 n/6 . We note that all the results presented in this section can easily be adapted to the closely-related partition problem, in which we are given a set of n integers, U = {x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n }, and our goal is to partition U into two complementary subsets U 1 , U 2 whose elements sum up to the same value.
5.2.1. Representing Knapsack as a Bicomposite Problem. First, we represent knapsack as a composite problem. We treat the problem of choosing the vector = ( 1 , . . . , n ) as a sequence of n atomic decisions, where the i'th decision is whether to assign i = 0 or i = 1. We introduce a counter C which is initially set to zero, and then at the i'th step, if the choice is i = 1 then C is replaced by C + x i (mod2 n ), and if the choice is i = 0, then C is left unchanged. Note that the value of C after the n'th step is i = i x i (mod2 n ), and hence, the sequence of choices leads to the desired solution if and only if the final value of C is S.
In this representation, the partition problem has all the elements of a composite problem: an initial state (C initial = 0), a final state (C f inal = S), and a sequence of n steps, such that in each step, we have to choose one of two possible atomic and invertible actions. Our goal is to find a sequence of choices which leads from the initial state to the final state. In terms of the execution matrix, we define S i to be the value of C after the i'th step (which is an n-bit binary number), and a i to be the action transforming S i−1 to S i , whose possible values are either C ← C + x i (mod2 n ) or C ← C.
The second step is to represent the problem as a bicomposite problem. The main observation we use here is the fact that for any two integers a, b, the m'th least significant bit of a + b( mod 2 n ) depends only on the m least significant bits of a and b (and not on their other bits). Hence, if we know the m LSBs of S i−1 and the action a i , we can compute the m LSBs of S i .
Using this observation, we define S i,j to be the j'th most significant bit of S i . This leads to an n-by-n execution matrix S i,j for i, j ∈ 1, 2, . . . , n with the property that if we choose any rectangle within the execution matrix which includes the rightmost column of the matrix, knowledge of the substates S j i−1 , S j+1 i−1 , ..., S n i−1 along its top edge and knowledge of the actions a i , a i+1 , ...a to its left suffices in order to compute the substates S j , S j+1 , ..., S n along its bottom edge. In order to handle general rectangles, we ensure that all enumerations of intermediate states in the algorithm are done from right to left, i.e., in each state, the LSB is guessed first, then the second least significant bit is guessed, etc. As a result, when we deal with the processing of the state S j i−1 to S j via the actions a i , a i+1 , ...a , we already know the states S k i−1 for all k > j, and hence, we can keep track of the carry bits into the j-th bit in the addition operations. Thus, our representation effectively satisfies the conditions of a bicomposite representation.
So far, we have represented knapsack as a bicomposite problem with an n-by-n execution matrix. In order to make the representation similar to the multiple encryption problem considered in Sections 3 and 4, we note that for any r n, the problem has a bicomposite representation with an r-by-r execution matrix.
Indeed, in the representation as a composite problem above, we can group sequences of n/r consecutive decisions, 16 such that we have r atomic decisions, where in the i-th atomic decision we choose ( (i−1)n/r+1 , (i−1)n/r+2 , . . . , in/r ) ∈ {0, 1} n/r , and the operation is C ← C + in/r j=(i−1)n/r+1 j x j (mod 2 n ).
Similarly, in the bicomposite representation, we define S i,j as an n/r-bit value which consists of bits (j − 1)n/r + 1, (j − 1)n/r + 2, . . . , jn/r of S i , where the counting order starts with the MSB indexed by 1. Thus, unlike the Rubik's cube problem considered in Section 5.1 where r is fixed to 20, in the knapsack problem we have the freedom to choose r such that the time complexity of the algorithm will be minimized, for a given amount of memory.
Formally, for any r n, we apply one of the algorithms for multiple encryption described in Sections 3 and 4 to an r-encryption scheme with a block size of n * = n/r bits and a memory parameter of m * . As the memory complexity of the resulting algorithm is 2 m * n * = 2 m * n/r , it follows that if we want the memory complexity to be 2 mn , we should consider m * = rm. We denote by f (r, n * , m * ) the running time of our optimal dissection algorithm (among the algorithms presented in this paper) for r-encryption with a block size of n * bits and M * = 2 m * n * available memory. In these notations, the problem of finding the optimal dissection algorithm for n-bit knapsack is reduced to finding r that minimizes f (r, n * , m * ) = f (r, n/r, mr). We call such a value of r an optimal value. We note that the deterministic algorithms applied in [Howgrave-Graham and Joux 2010] and [Becker et al. 2011] for 2 n/16 ≤ M ≤ 2 n/4 implicitly perform a reduction to multiple encryption with the fixed parameters r = 4 and r = 16. In fact, these algorithms are closely related to our Square r algorithms described in Section 3.3. However, as we show below, we can get a better tradeoff curve by using other choices of r.
Dissecting the Knapsack Problem.
In this section, we use the dissection algorithms presented in Sections 3 and 4 to obtain a new time-memory tradeoff curve of algorithms for the knapsack problem. We aim at obtaining a complete curve, which yields for any fixed memory complexity 2 mn , the time complexity 2 tn of our optimal dissection algorithm.
We consider deterministic and general algorithms separately. In the deterministic case, we show that the curve is piece-wise linear, with "cut" points at all values of the form m = 1/b j where b j is the j-th element of the sequence M agic 1 = {2, 4, 7, 11, 16, 22, 29, . . .} presented in Section 3. For each such m = 1/b j , an optimal algorithm is obtained by choosing r = b j and m * = rm = 1. The tradeoff in the deterministic case is presented in Figure 10 .
In the non-deterministic case, the situation is similar, with the sequence M agic 1 replaced by the corresponding magic sequence presented in Section 4, i.e., M agic {8, 16, 32, 56, 88, 128 , . . .}. It turns out that non-deterministic dissection algorithms outperform the deterministic ones for m < 9/104. A comparison between our general tradeoff curve and the previous results of [Becker et al. 2011; Howgrave-Graham and Joux 2010 ] is presented in Figure 11 . A comparison between our time-memory tradeoff curve and the curve obtained in [Becker et al. 2011 ] (shown as a dashed line) for deterministic algorithms. Our curve (defined for m ≤ 1/4) is strictly better than the curve obtained in [Becker et al. 2011] (defined only for 1/16 ≤ m ≤ 1/4) for any 1/16 < m < 1/4. and 1 ≤ < j such that r is of the form r = b j−1 rm + ij + . Since by the assumption, 1/m = sb j−1 + (1 − s)b j , we can write i = s /rm for some s > s. By the structure of the sequence M agic rm , we have Gain(A) = jrm + (1 − s )/rm < s · jrm + (1 − s) · (j + 1)rm (since the gain at r = b j−1 rm+i(s /rm)+ is equal to the gain atr = b j−1 rm+i(s /rm)).
The claim follows by substituting f (r, n/r, mr) = 2 n * −rm−Gain(A) .
Combination of the three propositions above yields the complete tradeoff described in Figure Optimal choice of r for non-deterministic dissection algorithms. The arguments presented above hold with only slight changes for non-deterministic algorithms, with the M agic sequences replaced by the corresponding M agic N D sequences presented in Section 4. The resulting tradeoff curve is given, along with the tradeoff curves corresponding to deterministic dissection algorithms and to previous results, in Figure 11 .
SUMMARY AND OPEN PROBLEMS
In this paper we introduced the new dissection technique which can be applied to a broad class of problems which have a bicomposite structure. We used this technique to obtain improved complexities for several well studied problems such as the cryptanalysis of multiple-encryption schemes and the solution of hard knapsacks. The main open problem in this area is to either improve our techniques or to prove their optimality. In particular, we conjecture (but can not prove) that any attack on multiple-encryption schemes should have a time complexity which is at least the square root of the total number of possible keys.
